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The implication of the hyperbolic discount
model for the annuitisation decisions
November 24, 2018
The low demand for immediate annuities at retirement has been a long-
standing puzzle. We show that a hyperbolic discount model can explain this
behaviour and results in the attractiveness of long-term deferred annuities.
With a set of benchmark assumptions, we find that retirees would be will-
ing to pay a much higher price than the actuarial fair price for annuities
with longer deferred periods. Moreover, if governments were to introduce
a pre-commitment device which requires pensioners to make annuitisation
decisions around ten years before retirement, the take up rate of annuities
could become higher.
Keywords: Hyperbolic discounting, Deferred annuities, Annuity puzzle, Reservation
price.
1 Introduction
Over the past few decades, the traditional defined benefit (DB) pension plan has been
gradually losing its dominance in private sector pension systems in many countries and
the defined contribution (DC) pension plan has become increasingly popular (OECD,
2016). Under the DC pension scheme, members contribute towards their personal pen-
sion savings in a way that enables them to make decisions on how to invest during the
accumulation stage and how to decumulate during retirement.
In the area of retirement, a constant focus is on whether retirees receive adequate
protection against longevity risk, the risk of outliving one’s wealth. As an insurance
product that eliminates the longevity risk, a lifetime annuity is a good option for DC
pensioners. A lifetime annuity provides a stream of income payments for as long as the
annuitant is alive, in exchange for an upfront premium charge. Yaari (1965) demonstrates
that in a life-cycle model a risk-averse individual without a bequest motive should hold all
their assets in annuities. However, empirical data has shown that retirees are reluctant to
convert retirement savings into annuities. The disparity between the theoretical optimal
choice and consumers’ actual preferences leads to the “annuity puzzle”. This can be
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illustrated by low levels of voluntary annuitisation in the UK market. In the past,
the UK had two distinct annuity markets: a voluntary segment called the Purchased
Life Annuity (PLA) market and a compulsory section called the Compulsory Purchase
Annuity (CPA). Based on UK annuity sales figures for the 1994-2006, sales in the CPA
market had been consistently higher than that in the PLA market. By 2010, the CPA
market had grown to £11.5 billion worth of annuity premiums while the PLA market
only had £72 million worth of sales (Cannon & Tonks, 2011).
Recently, the UK government implemented pension reforms to encourage free choice
of the mode of pension distribution and, as a result, retirees’ real preferences on annuity
products could be clearly seen. The reform follows the international trend of greater
pension flexibility, which has been observed in countries such as the USA, Australia and
Switzerland. Prior to the 2014 UK reform, there were strict restrictions on accessing
pension savings at retirement. For example, if a pensioner had overall pension savings
of greater than £18, 000 but could not access a guaranteed retirement income of more
than £20, 000 per year1, the only two choices that they could make were to either to
buy an annuity or enroll in a “capped drawdown”, which allowed them to withdraw as
much as 120 percent of an equivalent annuity each year during retirement. However,
after the 2014 policy change, everyone is able to choose a lump sum (full withdrawal),
an annuity or a drawdown, regardless of the size of their pension wealth (HM Treasury,
2014). With this move towards greater freedom of choice on how and when to access
pension wealth, annuity sales have experienced a large decline. In Q2 2015, £990m was
invested in annuities, showing a 44 percent decrease from the £1.8bn invested in Q2
2014. Moreover, 18, 200 annuities had been purchased in the three months after the
pension reform, showing a 61 percent decrease compared to Q2 2014 when 46, 700 were
purchased (ABI, 2015).
Many studies have suggested a number of reasons for the annuity puzzle, such as
mortality risk-sharing among families (Brown & Poterba, 2000) and the existence of
social security (Butler et al., 2016). Some research has examined the possible influences
of behavioural factors such as the framing effect, cumulative prospect theory and low
level of financial literacy; the findings suggest that the low demand for annuity could
be simply due to irrational behaviour (Cannon & Tonks, 2008). In the next Section,
Literature Review, we will provide a more detailed explanation of the reasons.
Since the annuity is a product that involves a series of payments at different points of
time, one of the behavioural factors that affects decision making is the inconsistency of
intertemporal choices. More specifically, when people assign values to future payouts, the
discount rate used to evaluate intertemporal choice is not fixed, but varies in line with the
length of the delay period, size and signs of the benefits. This effect is called hyperbolic
discounting and is interpreted as “temporal myopia”. The concept has been widely used
to account for behavioural bias in savings, nutrition, healthcare, drug addictions, and
other problems of willpower (Frederick et al., 2002). Laibson et al. (2003) have used
the model to explain the puzzle of simultaneously having large credit card debts and
1A guaranteed retirement annual income of £20, 000 is equivalent to a total pension savings of around
£310, 000 , according to stylised assumptions and calculations in HM Treasury (2014).
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pre-retirement savings.
In this paper, we use the hyperbolic discount model derived from experimental results
to analyse annuitisation decisions. In section 3, we provide a full explanation of the
model and suggest how to apply the model in valuing annuities. In terms of the prod-
ucts considered, we are interested in both immediate annuities and deferred annuities.
The deferred annuity is a contract that is purchased today but does not pay until the
annuitant survives to a pre-specified age. Compared with a conventional immediate an-
nuity, a deferred annuity has competitive advantages of a much lower price and provides
almost the same level of longevity insurance; therefore, it has aroused much discussion
in the area of retirement financial planning (see Milevsky, 2005; Gong & Webb, 2010;
Denuit et al., 2015). To uncover the annuitisation decisions of people at different ages,
two types of deferred annuities are studied: a working age deferred annuity (WADA),
which is purchased at working age and starts paying at retirement, and a retirement
age deferred annuity (RADA), which is purchased at retirement and starts paying a few
years later. To be more specific, we seek to explore four questions:
1. Can we use the hyperbolic discount model to explain the low demand for immediate
annuities at retirement and at a more advanced age?
2. Are pensioners at 65 years old interested in purchasing a RADA?
3. Would people at working age have an interest in purchasing a WADA (with a single
premium or with regular premiums)?
4. How would working-age members respond to a question asking them to decide
today whether to buy an immediate annuity at retirement?
To seek the answers to these questions, we adopt the hyperbolic discount model to
evaluate the perceived value of an annuity, which enables us to work out the reservation
price. By comparing the reservation price with the theoretical market price we can
determine whether an individual would choose an annuity or not. We show that time
inconsistent preference is one of the factors that stops retirees from converting their DC
account balances into annuities at retirement. More importantly, we identify a high
willingness to purchase long-term deferred annuities for hyperbolic discounters, both at
working age and in retirement. As the deferred period increases, the relative difference
between reservation price and actuarial price increases considerably and at a much faster
rate. Furthermore, if members are simply asked to make a decision on annuity purchase
and could delay the action until the point of retirement, those with around ten years
until retirement value the longevity protection the most.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review of
the explanation for the annuity puzzle from both the rational and behavioural framework.
In section 3, a detailed introduction of the hyperbolic model is offered. In section
4, we explain how the annuities in the four questions above are evaluated and how
the maximum acceptable price is derived. Major results and a sensitivity analysis are
presented in sections 5 and 6. Finally, in section 7 we conclude with major findings,
limitations of this study and suggestions for future work.
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2 Literature review
Yaari (1965) is the first to demonstrate the benefits of annuitisation in a life cycle
model with an uncertain lifetime. He shows that a rational investor should invest his
retirement savings in annuities rather than bonds to finance retirement. This result rests
on three fundamental assumptions: a complete annuity market, a specific utility function
(having the property of additive separability) and the absence of a bequest motive. The
subsequent literature on annuities has relaxed one or two of these assumptions in order
to assess if these factors lead to the low demand for annuities.
Annuities in a rational framework
Observing the annuity market from the supply side, a less competitive price could be
the reason for low demand. Brown & Warshawsky (2001) calculate the money’s worth
value of an annuity using average mortality rates of the population and find that an
individual could expect to receive only 85 pence per pound invested, thus justifying the
existence of adverse selection in annuity pricing.
Since an annuity stops paying once the annuitant dies, people with a motive to be-
queath part of their wealth obtain less welfare by purchasing a life annuity. A large
literature has focused on how the bequest motive impacts the demand for annuities and
shows that a strong bequest motive can eliminate the desire to purchase annuities (see
Friedman & Warshawsky, 1990; Vidal-Melia & Lejarraga-Garcia, 2006; Lockwood, 2012).
Intra-family mortality sharing can also be regarded as a substitute for an annuity.
Since families often share a common budget constraint, mortality risk sharing among
family members can offer a substitution for risk sharing in the annuity market. To an
extent, this resembles the bequest motive; an individual who dies early leaves his wealth
to subsidise other family members who are alive. Brown & Poterba (2000) find evidence
showing that the utility gain from annuitisation for a couple is significantly lower than
that for single people.
An alternative explanation for the low demand for additional annuitisation is the
existence of social security and private DB pension plans. According to Dushi & Webb
(2004), an exceptionally high proportion of a retired household’s wealth has been pre-
annuitised before retirement. Therefore, without purchasing an annuity in the open
market, these retirees already have a minimum level of income that will last for life.
Butler et al. (2016) also prove that the presence of social security reduces the value of
annuitisation.
A more recent discussion relates to the worry about health care expenditure shocks
at an older age and the fact that retirees may not need the smooth consumption that
an annuity provides. It is true that people have a higher probability of falling ill when
they become older; they may also have to make some age-specific investments in a house
such as installing a stair lift. Therefore we have reason to believe that a rational retiree
might want to live a very simple life in their early retirement period so that they can
save for unexpected health-related expenses (Sinclair & Smetters, 2004).
Lastly, while most research focuses on a comparison of full annuitisation aged 65 with
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the alternative of never annuitising, in practice, a retiree can choose between annuitising
now and delaying the decision until the next period. They can also annuitise only
a fraction of their wealth and enter a drawdown of the rest. Gavranovic (2011) has
demonstrated that the optimal annuitisation strategy for a pensioner without bequest
motive is to gradually convert all pension wealth to annuities by around age 80.
Annuities in a behavioural framework
The literature mentioned above seeks to solve the annuity puzzle within a strictly rational
framework. In recent years, however, there is an extensive literature on the behavioural
economics of retirement savings. This moves beyond the fully rational paradigm and
proposes some behavioural factors that could play important roles in determining how
retirees spend their retirement savings.
One important issue is the flaws in the expected utility hypothesis that arise from risk
aversion. Hu & Scott (2007) have explained the annuity puzzle by assuming that retirees
are loss-averse rather than risk-averse, and make annuity decisions based on Cumulative
Prospect Theory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1992). They also extend the application of
Cumulative Prospect Theory to deferred annuities and guaranteed annuities, showing
that the deferred annuity becomes optimal only when the first payment starts on or after
age 93.
Another behavioural factor, the framing effect, which states that individuals’ be-
haviour depends heavily on the way in which available choices are presented, is also
shown to be one of the influencing factors by Brown et al. (2008). They have shown that
72 percent of subjects prefer an annuity rather than a savings account when the choice
is framed in terms of consumption while 12 percent subjects choose an annuity when it
is framed in terms of an investment.
Moreover, Brown et al. (2012) show that it is difficult for people to make decisions when
choices are very complex and not repeated. The annuity is one example of a complex
financial product and the observed low level of annuity purchases may be explained by
this.
As annuity products involve a series of payments that come in the future, we be-
lieve that behavioural factors that affect discounting methods would influence annuity
valuations, and hence annuity purchase decisions. Laibson (1998) has used hyperbolic
discount models to explain a wide range of empirical anomalies, such as consumption
discontinuity at retirement and under-saving. In this paper, we use this model to study
annuitisation decisions. In the next section, we give a detailed explanation of the hyper-
bolic discount model.
3 An introduction to the hyperbolic discount model
In dealing with individuals’ annuitisation decisions and other economic decisions that
involve outcomes occurring at different points in time, researchers often use a discounted
utility framework to model such decisions. In a normative framework, the discount func-
tion adopted is often the exponential discount model, which assumes that the discount
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rate is constant over time and is independent of money amounts (or utilities). This
often leads to a conclusion that individuals’ preferences are stationary over time, i.e.
they have time-consistent preferences. In the real world, many empirical studies have
observed anomalies in actual behaviour compared with what is predicted by the expo-
nential discount function. Three major anomalies have been found. First, people tend
to act impulsively in the short-term but become more patient in the long-term. In other
words, the implicit rate at which people discount future rewards will vary inversely with
the length of waiting time. Thaler (1981) illustrates this with a simple example. Sub-
jects are asked to state their preferences on two questions: “Would you prefer one apple
today or two apples tomorrow?” and “Would you prefer one apple in one year or two
apples in one year plus one day?”. According to the exponential discounting method,
people who choose one apple today should make consistent choice of one apple in a year.
However, empirical results show that a significant fraction of subjects that prefer one
apple today would gladly wait one extra day in a year’s time in order to receive two
apples instead. Second, the implicit discount rates with regard to different reward sizes
would not stay the same. Thaler (1981) finds that the subjects are indifferent between
receiving $15 immediately and $60 in a year, between $250 now and $350 in a year,
and between an immediate $3000 and $4000 in a year, which means large reward sizes
have lower discount rates compared with small reward sizes. Third, there is a gain-loss
asymmetry in terms of discounting. For example, Loewenstein (1987) finds that a group
of subjects, on average, are indifferent between receiving an immediate $10 and receiving
$21 in a year; but are indifferent between paying $10 immediately and paying $15 in a
year. Similarly, the indifferent amount for receiving or paying an immediate $100 were
receiving $157 or paying $133 respectively in a year.
The anomalies introduced above can be addressed by a hyperbolic discount model,
which has been widely applied to explain the problem of addiction and self control. As
an example, people with low self-control often find it difficult to improve their health by
doing more exercise and having a diet. These people often pre-commit to forgo all future
temptations, in exchange for improved health in the future; however, when they have
their next meal, they cannot resist having unhealthy food and desserts (Redden, 2007).
Presumably, they prefer this because the instant pleasure delivered by delicious food
is greater than the heavily discounted future rewards of health. Therefore, the hyper-
bolic discount model is appropriate to describe the situation that people simultaneously
require immediate satisfaction and make commitments for the future.
Loewenstein & Prelec (1992) collectively present the experimental evidence and pro-
pose an explicit hyperbolic discount model to address the effect.
δ(t) = (1 + αt)−
β
α with α > 0, β > 0 (1)
where δ(t) is a discount function; α and β determine how much the function departs
from constant exponential discounting.
To identify the parameter values that capture most people’s intertemporal preferences,
Abdellaoui et al. (2009) conducted a parameter-free empirical measurement. In the
experiment, each subject is asked to specify an amount at a future time point t that is
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indifferent relative to a certain gain at the current time; Abdellaoui et al. (2009) elicit
different time weights by varying t. Relying on their results, we use the “Power discount
model” where α = 1 so that δ(t) = (1 + t)−β in our analysis; here the best estimate
β equals 0.19 for gains and 0.11 for losses. Please note that value of β would vary
with country/cultural background of the selected group of subjects and the limitation
is embedded in the experimental design. Therefore, in section 6, sensitivity to the
parameter β is explored, to show that the conclusions do not entirely depend on the
chosen values of the parameters.
Figure 1 here
Figure 1 provides a comparison between the hyperbolic discounting and exponential
discounting models. The horizontal axis represents the waiting time to receive £1 and
the vertical axis is the present value of the £1 to be received. The present value following
hyperbolic discounting decreases at a much faster rate in early years than following expo-
nential discounting, which means that the hyperbolic discounters adopt a higher level of
discounting for benefits that come in the early years than exponential discounters. How-
ever, if the benefits are to be received after 20 years (the intersection point), hyperbolic
discounters believe that they have a higher value than exponential discounters.
In addition to the discount function, a descriptive value function is also required in a
complete discounted utility framework. Loewenstein & Prelec (1992) discuss the neces-
sary characteristics of the value function without providing an explicit descriptive model.
Abdellaoui et al. (2009) design a parameter-free measurement of value in intertemporal
choices and hence derive the value function which addresses the absolute magnitude ef-
fect and the gain-loss asymmetry. In deriving this function, Abdellaoui et al. (2009) do
not specify the form of the utility model in the beginning; however, they construct the
shape of the value function from the experimental results2. After that, they find that the
model below (in Equation (2)) can provide the best fit to the shape of the value function;
and they estimate the parameter values. The value function v(ct) is given below with
γ being equal to 0.97 and θ being equal to 0.84. This function is concave for gains and
convex for losses, reflecting a property of “diminishing marginal sensitivity”. This value
function is assumed to be separable and additive over time as recorded in the literature.
v(ct) =
{ −(−ct)γ if ct < 0
cθt if ct ≥ 0 (2)
where ct represents the consumption rate that would take place at a future time t,
which is defined on the interval [0,T], and v(ct) represents the value of the consumption
amount.
The discount rates and the value function are combined to arrive at the overall value
2For details of this non-parametric method to derive the value function please refer to the paper by
Abdellaoui et al. (2009)
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of consumption streams.
V (c0, c1, ..., cT ) =
T∑
t=0
(δ(t)× v(ct)) (3)
A standard approach in the literature has been to use the exponential discount model
for δ(t) and an utility function, for example Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA),
for v(ct). In this analysis, we instead use the hyperbolic discount model in Equation (1)
and the corresponding value function given by Equation (2) to analyse annuity purchase
decisions. We therefore are able to analyse the effect of subjective views on the underlying
consumption streams.
4 Annuity Valuation
In this section, we introduce four scenarios to address the questions of annuitisation
decisions for people at different stages. Two types of annuities, immediate annuities and
deferred annuities, are discussed in this paper and they are priced at actuarially fair
rates. In order to make a fair decision, the overall utility, V , of the investment in each
scenario will be calculated. As we focus on people who show “temporal myopia”, the
amount of money is evaluated based on Equation (2) and time preference is modeled by
the “power discount model”, Equation (1) with α = 1. Let tpx denote the probability
that an x-year-old person can survive for t years and the maximum attainable age is set
to be 120. Four scenarios are described in detail below and the corresponding valuation
of the annuity investment is introduced.
a. Immediate annuities for retirees
Consider a retiree at age x(x ≥ 65) who needs to make a decision on whether to spend
a lump sum amount A to purchase an immediate annuity which pays ψ per annum in
advance. The overall value of this investment for the x-year-old is:
V1(x) = v(−A) +
119∑
i=x
(δ(i− x)× i−xpx × v(ψ)) (4)
b. RADA for retirees
Consider a 65-year-old pensioner (x = 65) who has just retired. The individual is faced
with a wide variety of RADA products which have deferred periods (d) from 1 to 30
years. By investing the pension lump sum amount A in a d-year deferred annuity, the
pensioner is entitled to a lifelong guaranteed annual income of ψ in d years. However,
nothing is paid back if he dies within the deferred period. The overall value of this
deferred annuity investment at the time of purchase is:
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V2(d) = v(−A) +
119∑
i=65+d
(δ(i− 65)× i−65p65 × v(ψ)) (5)
c. Working Age Deferred Annuity (WADA) for working age individuals3
An individual at age x (25 ≤ x ≤ 64) considers investing in a WADA which provides
annual incomes of ψ once the annuitant survives to retirement age 65. Either a single
premium A (at age x) or a series of regular premiums (spreading between age x and age
65) is required. The overall perceived value of this investment at the time of purchase
is (below we show the formulae of the case with a single premium):
V3(x) = v(−A) +
119∑
i=65
(δ(i− x)× i−xpx × v(ψ)) (6)
d. Decision on purchasing an immediate annuity at retirement for working
age individuals
In this scenario pension scheme members within the working age range (25 ≤ x ≤ 64)
are asked to make decisions in advance on whether to choose a pension lump sum A
at age 65 or a corresponding fair annuity starting at the same age. When evaluating
this annuity, the cash flows involved are exactly the same as the immediate annuity
purchased at age 65 (Scenario a); however the perceived value may be different because
the decision is made at an earlier age. If an individual decides to convert the lump sum
A into an annuity at retirement, the overall perceived value of this investment for the
individual is:
V4(x) = δ(65− x)× 65−xpx × v(−A) +
119∑
i=65
(δ(i− x)× i−xpx × v(ψ)) (7)
To determine whether an actuarially fairly priced annuity is attractive to purchase,
we follow Hu & Scott (2007) to use the “relative difference between reservation price
and fair price”, R, as the benchmark measure:
R =
Reservation Price−Actuarially fair price
Actuarially fair price
The “reservation price”, also called the “maximum acceptable price”, is the annuity
price that would make an individual indifferent to buying an annuity. According to
the valuation functions above, the reservation price is the initial price, A, that makes
the hyperbolic present value of an annuity, V , equal to zero. If the reservation price
is below the market price, the annuity would not be attractive for individuals to buy.
3The working age deferred annuity was a common product that was offered in the UK in the past.
However, it does form the basis of retirement products currently available in other countries, for
example Germany.
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Therefore, a positive R means individuals are willing to purchase a fairly priced annuity,
and a higher value of R implies greater willingness to purchase an annuity. R can also
be interpreted as the percentage more or less than the market price that an individual
would be prepared to pay for a product.
5 Results
In this analysis, we assume the annuity price is actuarially fair with no expenses or
profit loading. The price calculation is based on the UK mortality table “S2PML4”,
which describes the mortality experience of UK male pensioners of self-administered
pension schemes for the period from 2004 to 2011, and a constant interest rate of 3
percent. Annual income from annuity, ψ, is assumed to be 1 unit. Therefore, the fair
market price of the annuity and the reservation price that individuals would like to pay
can be calculated accordingly. In what follows, we provide results for the relative price
differences, R, under the four different scenarios, analyse the attitudes of investors to-
wards each type of annuity and discuss the relation between the relative price differences
and investors’ age or the length of the deferred period.
a. Immediate annuities for retirees
The results of the Relative Price Differences (R) with regard to different ages of purchase
are presented in Figure 2. Two major conclusions can be drawn from the figure. First,
all the outcomes in terms of R are negative, which means that for a group of retirees
who are aged between 65 and 95, fairly priced immediate annuities are unattractive
to purchase. Thus, evaluating annuitisation decisions by assuming time inconsistent
preferences is indeed a powerful behavioural explanation for retirees’ not converting
their defined contribution account balances into annuities. Secondly, as a newly retired
pensioner becomes older, his preference for the immediate annuity declines at first and
then increases after he reaches age 85. However, the relative difference in price is small
with R lying in the range of −3% and −10%.
The results presented appear to be inconsistent with recent research carried out by
Schreiber & Weber (2015), who find that the expected present value of an immediate
annuity declines monotonically with the age of purchase. Although both studies use the
power discounting model for annuity evaluation, different groups of people are targeted:
Schreiber & Weber (2015) survey working age individuals while we focus on retirees
above age 65; and this may explain the inconsistency.
Figure 2 here
b. Retirement Age Deferred Annuity (RADA) for retirees
Figure 3 shows the attractiveness of RADA with different deferred periods for a 65-
year-old retiree. It can be seen that although recently-retired individuals are reluctant
4Source: Continuous Mortality Investigation (2013).
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to purchase immediate annuities, they are willing to pay a higher-than-market price
for annuities with long deferred periods. From our modeling results, annuities that
are deferred for more than 10 years are generally welcomed by 65-year-old retirees.
Furthermore, we identify a positive relationship between the length of the deferred period
and the attractiveness of the corresponding deferred annuity. If an annuity has a deferred
period of 30 years, a 65-year-old individual would be prepared to pay 24% more than the
fair price5.This is a much higher margin than that for an immediate annuity. It implies
that such a product would have commercial potential since insurance companies could
add a greater loading in the pricing of deferred annuity products without changing their
attractiveness.
The popularity of deferred annuities have also been identified in other work. Hu &
Scott (2007) adopt Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT) to evaluate deferred annuities
with deferred periods of 0, 10, 20 and 30 years and find that the 30-year deferred annuity
is the most attractive to buy. In Chen et al. (2018), we also show that the attractiveness
of a deferred annuity increases with the length of the deferred period, according to CPT.
Figure 3 here
c. Working Age Deferred Annuity (WADA) for working age individuals
If individuals at working age are given the opportunity to enter a deferred annuity
contract that promises retirement incomes depending upon survival, their reactions are
examined and reflected in Figure 4. It can be seen that although people who are retired
are unsure of handing over a lump sum of money to insurance companies in exchange
for longevity protection, most people at working age tend to find a WADA attractive
to buy. Another interesting point worthy of note is that the decision maker’s age has
a negative effect on the attractiveness of this type of deferred annuity. For hyperbolic
discounters younger than 30-year-old, they appear even to be willing to pay double the
price of the WADA.
Figure 4 here
We know that as the length of deferred period increases, the actuarially fair price of
a deferred annuity which provides the same level of protection becomes cheaper; hence
younger individuals would be less hesitant to purchase a WADA which involves a smaller
initial outlay. In addition, given the assumption that people have time inconsistent pref-
erences, a young individual tends to overvalue all of the annuity incomes that come in the
distant future; however for an older individual, some of the deferred annuity payments
are highly likely to be undervalued. The results are consistent with our conclusions in
Scenario b. Purchasing the pension annuities at an earlier age means a longer deferred
period, and in both scenarios an annuity with a longer deferred period is more attractive.
5Please note the choice of 30-year deferred period is for the purpose of illustration. In reality, the
product may not be available.
11
The magnitude of R is much higher in Scenario c than in Scenario b because a longer
deferred period is considered.
The major conclusions regarding WADA also hold when we allow the deferred an-
nuity premiums to be spread over the entire deferred period. Being aware that young
individuals might not have enough savings to afford the lump sum premium to enter
the WADA contract, or a large lump sum to be paid years before receiving any benefits
might decrease the marketability, we consider the situation when premiums are to be
paid annually in advance between the age of purchase and the retirement age. If they
die before the retirement age, no premiums would be returned; otherwise they would
start receiving annuity payments from age 65 until the point of death. The results of
the Relative Price Difference (R) is shown in Figure 5. It again shows that most people
at working age (below age 60) would find a WADA attractive to buy; and the decision
maker’s age has a negative impact on the attractiveness of WADA6.
Figure 5 here
Some of our findings mirror those suggested elsewhere. Shu et al. (2016) have con-
ducted a choice-based stated-preference survey of adults aged between 45 and 65 and
find that younger subjects report a higher likelihood of purchases for annuities beginning
at age 65 than older subjects who are closer in age to the start date. DiCenzo et al.
(2011) have also discovered that pre-retirees have stronger preferences for annuities than
retirees based on online experimental research with 1,009 subjects aged between 45 and
75.
d. Decision on purchasing an immediate annuity at retirement for working age
individuals
Similar to the third scenario, we aim to discover the attitude of working age pension
scheme members towards an annuity with the first payment starting when pensioners
retire at age 65. Although the annuity investment payoffs are exactly the same, the
purchase is made at different points. In Scenario c, the price is paid now at age x while
in Scenario d, pensioners simply make a decision at age x but delay the purchase action
until age 65. If an individual dies prior to the time of retirement, his financial status
remain unchanged in Scenario d but he faces an absolute loss of the price paid in Scenario
c. Therefore, Scenario d effectively deals with the decision to buy an immediate annuity
rather than a deferred annuity.
6By comparing results of R in Figure 4 and Figure 5, one may conclude that a WADA with lump sum
premium is more attractive than with level premium spread over the deferred period. However, we
believe this is partly due to the choice of the hyperbolic discount parameter value and the exponential
discount parameter value. Comparing the two products with different premium structure, all incomes
during retirement would be the same. For the one with lump sum premium, the only one payment is
made at time 0 when no discount would apply. For the one with annual premium, payments spread
over a long horizon when some of them will be overvalued and some of them will be undervalued.
Given our assumptions of parameter values, the overall effect is a relative overvaluation of regular
payments, hence the ultimate R is lower for the WADA with annual premiums.
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Comparing the results of R in Figure 6 with those in Figure 4, we identify a different
pattern. For individuals below age 55, the attractiveness of the annuity increases slightly
with age. However for individuals above age 55, the attractiveness declines sharply
with age and becomes unattractive when individuals reach age 65. We notice that the
occurrence of the kink is due to the different discounting parameter β for gains and losses.
When the discounting parameter values for gains and losses are set to be the same, the
kink disappears and the attractiveness reduces with the waiting period (time point of
decision and retirement age)7. In future work we would look into the differences in the
gain loss discounting, and test how sensitive our results are to the gain-loss asymmetry.
With the results indicated by Figure 6, we suggest that policy makers who want to
promote annuitisation in public ask individuals to make a choice between lump sum and
annuities around 10 years before retirement. On the other hand, one may notice that
the change in R is relatively small, varying between 4% and 8%. It is similar to the
results for immediate annuities in Scenario a.
These findings confirm those in the survey by Schreiber & Weber (2015). In their
survey, subjects are asked to predict whether they will annuitise if they were at age
66. The total sample results show that the effect of age on the decision to purchase an
annuity is negative. However, observing the answers from a subsample of individuals
below age 51, the effect is no longer statistically significant. To some extent, it reveals
that people above age 51 have significant decreasing preferences towards annuities.
Figure 6 here
6 Sensitivity analysis
Previously, we assumed that each parameter value in the annuity calculations is based
on the work of Abdellaoui et al. (2009). However, questions remain as to whether
the behavioural biases would be stronger or weaker for people with different levels of
impatience, different income levels or different health status. In this section, we test
the sensitivity of the interest rate, the power discounting parameter, the value function
parameter, the income levels and mortality rates (by changing mortality tables).
Table 1 shows the results for R in Scenario a and Scenario b under different combina-
tions of assumptions. The row HB baseline lists the standard results that are based on
the benchmark assumptions in Abdellaoui et al. (2009). In the HB sensitivity analysis,
we change one factor listed in each row at a time so that we can observe the impact of
that factor on R. “Less” or “greater” is relative to the baseline results. Each column
represents different types of annuity products with the first payment starting at a dif-
ferent age. For example, an annuity starts paying at age 75 represents an immediate
annuity purchased at age 75 in Scenario a and a 10-year deferred annuity purchased at
age 65 in Scenario b.
Table 1 here
7Further results will be introduced in the section of Sensitivity Analysis
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The first factor that is of interest is the interest rate, which is an important factor in
pricing an annuity. As the interest rate moves from lower (r = 1%) to higher (r = 3%),
R consistently increases, for all types of immediate annuities and deferred annuities.
This feature is simply because a higher interest rate leads to a lower annuity price,
which helps investors lock in a high rate of return. For immediate annuity purchasers
(Scenario a), it is better to choose an annuity starting at age 65 when the interest rate
is high; however, it is better to delay the purchase when the rate in the market is low.
For deferred annuities (Scenario b), the interest rate is of less concern compared with
immediate annuities (because a smaller number of payments will be discounted). The
attractiveness of the deferred annuity will depend on the relative level of patience of
investors. For an individual with a certain level of impatience, they tend to overvalue
future benefits more heavily when the interest rate is higher. Therefore the longer-term
annuity becomes more attractive in a high interest rate environment.
Another factor that we investigate is the level of impatience, measured by β. Given
that the annuity pricing rate is deterministic, a higher β means that the decision maker
adopts a heavier undervaluation of earlier benefits and a lighter overvaluation of later
benefits. Reflecting on the curves in Figure 7, the intersection point between exponen-
tial discounting and hyperbolic discounting would come at a later stage as β increases.
Comparing our baseline results with less/greater impatience for both immediate annu-
ities and RADA, we conclude that the attractiveness of annuity products is consistently
lower in response to a greater level of impatience. This makes sense intuitively since
an individual with a greater level of impatience would have stronger present bias; they
would gain much higher satisfaction from consuming now rather than converting the
lump sum into future cash flows and consuming regularly. According to Table 1, rel-
atively patient individuals (β = 0.15) are willing to pay a slightly higher price, 4.82%
and 1.64% respectively, for immediate annuities at age 65 and 70. It is because they are
patient to wait and assign more weight to future incomes. Investment opportunities that
convert current consumption into a future stream of cash flow are attractive to them.
The same reasons lead to the attractiveness of deferred annuities for this group of people
(see the row corresponding to β = 0.15 in Scenario b).
Figure 7 here
Greater or lower value sensitivity is measured by the parameters in the value function.
A smaller value of θ (or γ) means the marginal value that an individual would gain (lose)
from an additional amount of gain (loss) is smaller. As the experimental results suggest
that people’s attitudes towards gains and losses are different, we maintain a difference
of 0.1 between γ and θ in the sensitivity analysis. In Scenario a, we find that immediate
annuities becomes less popular as people become older. However, if retirees underesti-
mate the losses from paying annuity premiums (γ = 0.9), an annuity could become more
popular (with a positive R). This impact is also seen in Scenario b with regard to the
case of deferred annuities. Previously in the baseline results, only annuities with long
deferred periods would be popular, however, with an assumption of loss underestimation
(γ = 0.9), annuities with shorter deferred periods are also attractive.
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The effect of annuity income levels is examined to capture the variation in decisions
of people with different wealth levels. Two levels of annual income, 0.07218 unit and 3
units, are adopted to represent relatively poor people and relatively rich people. Based
on the value function in the hyperbolic discount model introduced above, people tend to
overvalue the amount of less than one unit and undervalue the amount of greater than
one unit. This is reasonable since people often place more values on the initial accumu-
lation of an amount of money and this portion of money is intended for the purchase
of necessities such as food, utilities and rent. Therefore, the results corresponding to
ψ = 0.0721 and ψ = 3 in Scenario a and Scenario b show that relatively wealthy people
who can afford an annuity with higher annual incomes are willing to pay a lower-than-
market price, while relatively poor people are willing to pay a much higher-than-market
price for annuities.
The mortality sensitivity analysis is conducted by comparing results from two mor-
tality tables: S2PMA-L, the mortality experience of male pensioners with high pension
amounts and relatively lower mortality rates, and S2PMA-H, the mortality experience of
male pensioners with low pension amounts and relatively higher mortality rates. Results
in Scenario a show pensioners with the highest mortality rates (S2PMA-H) tend to find
immediate annuities the least attractive. Similarly, those with low mortality rates and
long life expectancies (S2PMA-L) show the greatest interest in RADA, as is observed in
Scenario b.
Table 2 shows the results in terms of R in Scenario c and Scenario d. In Table 2, we
can see the sensitivity of four factors: the interest rate, the level of impatience, the value
sensitivity, the level of income and mortality rates, on the annuitisation decisions.
Table 2 here
The sensitivity analysis of the interest rate in Scenario c and Scenario d again shows
that annuities are generally attractive in a high interest rate environment. Moreover, as
the deferred period increase, the increase in attractiveness (R) is greater when the inter-
est rate is higher. As explained previously, the reason behind this is that an individual
with a certain level of impatience would overvalue future benefits more heavily when the
interest rate is higher. When the deferred period is greater than a certain number of
years, it is possible that all payments will be overvalued.
By comparing results corresponding to β = 0.15 and β = 0.25, we find those at
working age see annuities as more valuable when they experience less impatience. In
addition, for decision makers with different levels of impatience, the effect of their age
on the WADA’s attractiveness is consistently negative. In other words, the longer the
waiting period to receive the first annuity income is, the higher the possibility of purchase
will be. The intuition behind these features is as follows: incomes that arrive further in
the future are more likely to be overvalued and thus the deferred annuity with a longer
waiting period has a higher maximum acceptable price.
8The value is chosen as the annual income from converting one unit at age 65-year-old into an immediate
annuity.
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The results with different levels of value sensitivities in Scenario c and Scenario d
reinforce our conclusions drawn from Table 1. In general, deferred annuities are more
attractive when the deferred period is longer. A greater underestimation of losses would
make the deferred annuities even more attractive. We note that the underestimation of
gains also has an impact on the results, however the impact (for example θ changing
from 0.9 to 0.8) is much less significant than that of the underestimation of losses. This
feature occurs because our model considers a one-off lump sum premium payment for
entering an annuity contract.
In Scenario d where the real purchase of an immediate annuity is delayed until re-
tirement, we have shown in the baseline results (which assume that β is 0.19 for gains
and 0.11 for losses in the power discount function) that people have the greatest interest
in buying an annuity around age 55. However in the sensitivity analysis when we let
discount rates for gains and losses be the same, the peak in the trend of R disappears
and we see a gradual decrease of value of R relative to the age of decision making.
In such a case, governments may simply encourage individuals to make annuitisation
decisions earlier rather than 10 years before retirement. Whether people use different
discount rates for gains and losses and the resulting impact on annuitisation decisions
needs future research.
Results corresponding to ψ = 0.0721 and ψ = 3 in Scenario c and Scenario d show
that wealthy decision makers who can afford an annuity with a high annual income tend
to find annuities less attractive. The impact of income levels on the annuity purchasing
behaviour are consistent for decision makers at all ages9.
The sensitivity of mortality rates in Table 2 indicates intuitively that annuities are
more attractive for individuals with longer life expectancies, regardless of the age of
decision making and the age of annuity purchase. Furthermore, for different mortality
groups, age presents a negative influence on the attractiveness of a WADA. If the an-
nuitisation decision needs to be made at working age and the actual purchases could
be delayed until retirement, those between 50 and 55 are the most likely to choose an
annuity and a strong decline in annuity preferences exists for pensioners older than 55.
In order to measure the responsiveness of the Relative Price Difference to the change
in each parameter, we calculate the elasticity of the Relative Price Difference, ER. It
addresses the percentage change in the Relative Price Difference for a given percentage
change in the parameter value and the formula is as follows:
ER =
Percentage change in R
Percentage change in parameter value
=
4R
Raverage
4parameter
parameteraverage
(8)
In Equation (8), 4R stands for the absolute change in R and 4parameter stands
for the absolute change in the considered parameter values. Raverage stands for the
absolute value of average of R under different parameter values and parameteraverage is
the absolute value of the average of chosen parameter values. As the average value is
used to calculate the percentage change, the elasticity of the Relative Price Difference
9The results presented here are a reflection of our model; hence highly dependent on whether the annual
income is greater than one unit or not. This model does not consider other sources of income.
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can be regarded as a point mid-way among all of the R results. After we calculate ER for
each immediate annuity or for each deferred annuity, we average the results and obtain
the elasticity of the Relative Price Difference for annuities in four different scenarios.
The results are presented in Table 3. Please note that we use life expectancy at the age
of annuity purchase as an index for each mortality table.
Table 3 here
If ER is greater than 1, the Relative Price Difference changes proportionately more
than the parameter value changes. If ER is less than 1, the Relative Price Difference
changes proportionately less than the parameter value changes, implying a less sensitive
parameter. Based on the results in Table 3, the following conclusions can be drawn.
First, the interest rate is a very sensitive factor in influencing annuity purchase decisions,
especially immediate annuity purchase decisions. This is reasonable as the interest rate is
one of the most important annuity pricing factors. For immediate annuity products that
requires a large initial payment, a small change in interest rate can change premium
greatly. Second, the Relative Price Difference is responsive to a small change in the
level of impatience, which is measured by β. It confirms our findings in the sensitivity
results of Table 1 and 2 that people with different levels of patience would hold distinct
opinions regarding the purchase of annuities. Third, the Relative Price Difference is
very sensitive to the parameter values of the value function; and the sensitivity is more
significant for immediate annuity products than for deferred annuity products. This is
due to the property of “diminishing marginal sensitivity”, the deviation of the perceived
value from the real value would be more significant for an annuity product with a higher
price. Fourth, deferred annuities have greater sensitivity to mortality parameters than
immediate annuities. This is partly due to the fact that incomes generated from the
deferred annuities will be delayed for a few years; hence there is a possibility that the
annuitant would not receive any incomes should they die during the deferred period.
7 Conclusions
Although purchasing an annuity at retirement can guarantee lifetime incomes, people
are reluctant to spend their retirement savings on annuities voluntarily. In the UK,
with fewer restrictions on accessing retirement savings, the demand for annuities has
decreased and thus insurance companies are making efforts to design more attractive
annuity products. This paper discusses the implications of one behavioural factor, time
inconsistent preferences (as represented by the hyperbolic discount model), on the an-
nuity purchasing decision.
Based on the analysis, we have the following primary findings. First, for an 65-year-
old retiree, the reservation price of an immediate annuity is lower than the market price,
and thus the hyperbolic discount method captures the low demand for annuities at
retirement, as seen in practice.
Second, under the hyperbolic discount model, deferred annuities are attractive for
pension scheme members at all ages. The attractiveness generally increases with the
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deferred period. For instance, those below the age of 30 would pay more than double
the market price for the WADA. However, our model does not account for factors such
as affordability, a liquidity requirement and expected retirement living standards. While
a 25-year-old man who wants to receive an annual annuity income of £40, 000 after
retirement might find a 40-year deferred annuity attractive; he will most probably not
be able to afford the annuity price of £150, 034.610 at this young age. With time passing,
he will accumulate wealth and set aside a portion for retirement protection. Often, there
will be a point when accumulated retirement savings equal the deferred annuity price;
this is the optimal age of purchase. Alternatively, a more affordable plan is to choose
regular premiums spreading over the period between current age and retirement age.
We have shown that the positive relationship between attractiveness and the deferred
period is maintained under this scenario of regular premiums.
We recommend using the deferred annuity contract as a retirement solution because
it requires a smaller initial investment than the immediate annuity and provides similar
longevity insurance. In addition, based on the fact that analytical cognitive function
ability declines dramatically for older adults, it would be wise to buy a RADA to protect
consumption at very advanced ages. For those in their 80s, it has been shown that 20
percent have fully diagnosed dementia and 30 percent have severe cognitive impairment;
and thus, it would be difficult for these individuals to make rational withdrawal decisions
if there were no income protection in place (Laibson, 2009).
Currently when the public has limited knowledge on deferred annuities, a policy recom-
mendation we would like to draw is to introduce compulsory annuitisation with respect
to deferred annuities. The significant decrease in annuity sales after the pension reform
may cause unforeseeable social problems in future especially for those who have limited
financial knowledge to manage pension savings effectively and wisely. Although we sup-
port the idea of flexible choices in pensions arrangements, we believe that the annuity
product’s main function of providing longevity risk protection should be retained to
some extent. Overall, making the deferred annuity purchase a compulsory choice would
have the following benefits. First, it can protect individuals against myopia, and protect
governments from potential increasing expenditure on social benefits. Second, it would
encourage life insurance companies to enter the market and start offering deferred an-
nuity products. Third, a compulsory policy helps to reduce or remove adverse selection,
which is of vital importance in insurance markets. A reduced degree of adverse selection
would ensure a large efficient market, and it would mean that annuitants are more likely
to receive close to 100% of the fair annuity value.
In Scenario d, we observe that individuals around the age of 55 are those who would
most likely commit to buy an immediate annuity at the point of retirement. Relying on
this result, another policy recommendation can be drawn. With the aim of promoting
the purchase of annuities among retirees and releasing the burden from social benefit
claiming, governments are advised to introduce a pre-commitment device asking people
10The price is the actuarially fair annuity price based on assumptions of 3% annual real rate of return,
mortality table S2PML and zero profit loading. We also assume nothing is returned if the individual
dies before age 65
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to make annuitisation decisions around 10 years before retirement. When they reach
retirement, their original decisions could be changed but some efforts, such as making a
phone call or writing a letter, are required. In fact, in Denmark, the decisions on annuity
purchases can be made during the accumulation period. As a result, about 50 percent
of defined contribution assets are used to buy WADA type products for those aged in
their 40’s, 50’s and 60’s (Andersen & Skjodt, 2008).
In the sensitivity analysis, we have explained that the optimal point of age 55 is due
to different discounting parameter values used for gains and losses. The kink would
disappear if we were to assume the same discounting factors for gains and losses. In
future work, we would like to look into the area of gain-loss discounting asymmetry and
examine more detailed impacts on our conclusions.
It is worth mentioning that currently the deferred annuity products (WADA and
RADA) do not exist in the UK insurance market; therefore, we don’t have empirical data
to support the popularity of the deferred annuity. This could be due to some practical
difficulties for insurance companies , for example, strict solvency capital requirement and
unavailability of matching assets. The findings in this paper are more about suggesting
theoretical annuity products ideas to improve retirement product design.
Although we have shown that inconsistent time preference is one of the reasons for
the annuity puzzle, the results largely rely on how the hyperbolic discount model is
calibrated in Abdellaoui et al. (2009). In summary, there are three limitations with the
model calibration. First, the discount model was built using the concept of consumption,
but Abdellaoui et al. (2009) study the discounting of money amounts. Consumption is
different from money amounts since a decision maker who has no liquidity constraints
would not consider his preferences when valuing money amounts. Hence, experimental
results do not measure the true discount function, but a combination of the discount
function, liquidity constraints and bounded rational thinking about money. Second,
subjects in the experiment were young university students who may share completely
different views about money and time discounting compared to older workers and re-
tirees. Their views may reflect a specific cultural or country background as well. Third,
the money amounts in the experimental questions are much smaller than the size of one’s
pension savings. Overall, the results provide a more qualitative rather than a precise
quantitative explanation of the relative attractiveness of annuities.
In general, there are some other limitations and implications for future work. First,
this paper uses the value function and discount function directly from the results in
Abdellaoui et al. (2009). Both functions are consistently based on the same experiments.
We leave to future work an exploration of other variations of the utility function, such
as the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) or Epstein-Zin utility functions, and the
impact of risk aversion. Second, this paper does not consider the bequest motive and
long term care needs. These two factors are very important in making annuity purchase
decisions, and hence allowing for them in the modeling framework would give more
robust conclusions.
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Figure 1: A comparison of hyperbolic discounting and exponential discounting
Notes: Vertical axis, discount function, represents the present value of £1 to be received at
time t. We assume a constant interest rate of 3 percent for exponential discounting; α = 1 and
β = 0.19 for hyperbolic discounting.
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Figure 2: the Relative Price Difference (R) of immediate annuities for retirees at age (x)
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Figure 3: the Relative Price Difference (R) of d-year retirement age deferred annuities
(RADA) for 65-year-old retirees
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Figure 4: the Relative Price Difference (R) of d-year Working Age Deferred Annuities
(WADA) with the lump sum premium for individuals at age (x)
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Figure 5: the Relative Price Difference (R) of d-year Working Age Deferred Annuities
(WADA) with level premiums for individuals at age (x)
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Figure 6: the Relative Price Difference (R) of an immediate annuity purchased at retire-
ment for working age individuals at age (x)
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Figure 7: A comparison of hyperbolic discounting with different levels of impatience
Notes: We assume a constant interest rate of 3 percent for exponential discounting; α = 1 for
hyperbolic discounting.
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Table 1: Sensitivity analysis of the Relative Price Difference (R) in Scenario a and Sce-
nario b
R
Age of first annuity payment
65 70 75 80 85
Scenario a
HB baseline −3.60% −5.84% −7.51% −8.57% −8.99%
HB sensitivity analysis
Lower interest rate (r = 1%) −20.00% −19.32% −18.33% −17.01% −15.39%
Higher interest rate (r = 5%) 13.59% 8.08% 3.48% −0.11% −2.66%
Less impatience (β = 0.15) 4.82% 1.64% −0.97% −2.95% −4.28%
Greater impatience (β = 0.25) −14.76% −15.83% −16.33% −16.21% −15.45%
Lower value sensitivity (γ = 1, θ = 0.9) −10.08% −11.53% −12.37% −12.52% −12.00%
Greater value sensitivity (γ = 0.9, θ = 0.8) 15.66% 10.88% 6.53% 2.69% −0.59%
Lower income level (ψ = 0.0721) 34.08% 30.30% 27.06% 24.29% 21.86%
Higher income level (ψ = 3) −15.81% −17.55% −18.72% −19.22% −18.99%
Lighter mortality rates (S2PMA-L) −2.39% −5.01% −7.04% −8.40% −9.02%
Greater mortality rates (S2PMA-H) −4.06% −6.16% −7.71% −8.65% −9.00%
Scenario b
HB baseline −3.60% −3.50% 0.09% 5.15% 11.10%
HB sensitivity analysis
Lower interest rate (r = 1%) −20.00% −25.03% −27.35% −28.88% −30.22%
Higher interest rate (r = 5%) 13.59% 21.95% 35.74% 53.29% 74.58%
Less impatience (β = 0.15) 4.82% 7.22% 12.47% 19.15% 26.80%
Greater impatience (β = 0.25) −14.76% −17.54% −15.94% −12.83% −8.87%
Lower value sensitivity (γ = 1, θ = 0.9) −10.08% −9.64% −4.98% 1.56% 9.83%
Greater value sensitivity (γ = 0.9, θ = 0.8) 15.66% 14.44% 14.56% 15.06% 14.47%
Lower income level (ψ = 0.0721) 34.08% 37.28% 42.40% 49.56% 58.06%
Higher income level (ψ = 3) −15.81% −16.71% −13.61% −9.25% −4.11%
Lighter mortality rates (S2PMA-L) −2.39% −1.90% 1.80% 6.86% 12.76%
Greater mortality rates (S2PMA-H) −4.06% −4.13% −0.61% 4.41% 10.32%
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Table 2: Sensitivity analysis of the Relative Price Difference (R) in Scenario c and Sce-
nario d
R
Age of decision making
25 35 45 55 65
Scenario c
HB baseline 119.85% 70.90% 34.63% 8.88% −3.60%
HB sensitivity analysis
Lower interest rate (r = 1%) −16.72% −21.24% −24.52% −25.72% −20.00%
Higher interest rate (r = 5%) 459.09% 258.56% 133.05% 55.51% −13.59%
Less impatience (β = 0.15) 158.52% 99.11% 54.99% 23.17% 4.82%
Greater impatience (β = 0.25) 72.42% 35.90% 9.01% −9.46% −14.76%
Lower value sensitivity (γ = 1, θ = 0.9) 106.37% 60.18% 25.92% 1.49% −10.08%
Greater value sensitivity (γ = 0.9, θ = 0.8) 159.06% 102.15% 60.11% 30.65% 15.66%
Lower income level (ψ = 0.0721) 212.74% 143.11% 91.51% 54.89% 34.08%
Higher income level (ψ = 3) 89.74% 47.50% 16.20% −6.02% −15.81%
Lighter mortality rates (S2PMA-L) 125.75% 75.34% 37.96% 11.29% −2.39%
Greater mortality rates (S2PMA-H) 117.69% 69.27% 33.40% 7.98% −4.06%
Scenario d
HB baseline 4.32% 5.41% 6.52% 7.15% −3.60%
HB sensitivity analysis
Lower interest rate (r = 1%) −13.42% −12.51% −11.59% −11.07% −20.00%
Higher interest rate (r = 5%) 22.93% 24.21% 25.52% 26.26% 13.59%
Less impatience (β = 0.15) 40.37% 39.12% 36.96% 32.21% 4.82%
Greater impatience (β = 0.25) 37.28% 35.26% 31.82% 24.40% −14.76%
Lower value sensitivity (γ = 1, θ = 0.9) −2.96% −1.99% −0.99% −0.43% −10.08%
Greater value sensitivity (γ = 0.9, θ = 0.8) 26.09% 27.52% 29.00% 29.83% 15.66%
Lower income level (ψ = 0.0721) 45.31% 46.85% 48.44% 49.33% 34.08%
Higher income level (ψ = 3) −8.97% −8.03% −7.07% −6.53% −15.81%
Lighter mortality rates (S2PMA-L) 6.84% 7.89% 8.92% 9.34% −2.39%
Greater mortality rates (S2PMA-H) 3.36% 4.46% 5.61% 6.31% −4.06%
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Table 3: Elasticity of the Relative Price Difference (ER)
Parameters r β θ and γ ψ e˚
ER(a) 4.9089 3.5925 7.6139 0.5814 0.5567
ER(b) 3.3086 10.8408 5.8976 2.7054 2.8380
ER(c) 2.4846 2.3399 4.8602 2.3942 2.0000
ER(d) 2.4376 0.5886 5.8920 1.4574 2.9251
Notes: r represents the interest rate, β defines the level of impatience, θ and γ define the value
function, ψ represents the income level and e˚ represents the life expectancy corresponding to
each mortality table.
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